Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950–1992

Author: Charles K. Armstrong

Few books have accurately described the internal mechanisms that drive both the domestic and foreign policies of North Korea. This has led to a pervasive perspective in the West that North Korea is a ‘hermit kingdom’ which seeks to insulate its domestic population from external influences while simultaneously advancing a foreign policy that supports a political system which aims to hold back superpowers from interfering with its internal affairs. Fortunately, Professor Charles Armstrong of Columbia University has written an excellent book, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World (1950–1992), which demystifies the internal workings of North Korea while concurrently succinctly explaining the reasoning behind the policies formulated by the political leadership of the communist state.

In the beginning of the book, Professor Armstrong points out that fissures do exist in the international system due to the persistence of periodic conflicts in certain regions as further expounded by the following statement:

“Certain places in the world act as fractures in the international system, points of contact between the tectonic plates of historical change that erupt periodically into conflicts that spread beyond the region to draw in the Great Powers, and which remain in constant tension even in times of relative peace.”(p.1)

He then goes ahead and names the Korean peninsula as a region which has experienced a perennial conflict which has drawn the major global superpowers into confrontation. The author then goes ahead to point out that there is a certain lack of understanding of how North Korea operates within the international system since the policy formulators, politicians and other concerned parties responsible for foreign policy formulation and implementation have an inadequate comprehension of the internal mechanisms and processes which operate the political system in North Korea.

A critical reading of Tyranny of the Weak will enable the reader to decipher the principal intentions which motivated Professor Armstrong to write the book. The chief motivator for Professor Armstrong was to demystify the perception that North Korea as an impenetrable system whose inner workings were incomprehensible (p. 4-5). This pervasive belief is informed largely by the fact that the actions of the North Korean government have either been provocative, irrational, unpredictable or sometimes suicidal (p.8). In the book, Professor Armstrong explains the motivations which lead the North Korean political establishment to create the processes which guide their overall operations; and what were the effects of these processes on the foreign policies which guided the establishment of foreign relations for the communist state especially during the era of the Cold War (p.9).

It is common knowledge that the value of a book is contingent on the authenticity and veracity of the information it contains. Since information pertaining to North Korea is particularly hard to come by inside the communist state (p.7), and the available information in the public domain is either relatively scarce or polluted by propaganda and disinformation (p.65); Professor Armstrong decided to collect and collate his information from archival sources. The main archives that professor Armstrong used in his extensive research when preparing the book are the archives of both the present and former allies of North Korea including China, the former Soviet Union, East Germany and other Eastern bloc countries (North Korea itself rarely declassifies its information pertaining to foreign policies or military affairs). Also, the author has drawn information from the central NKIDP (North Korea Independent Documentation Project) and when deemed appropriate, he has conducted interviews with the relevant parties (p.7). Most of the archival data was written by members of either the state security or the foreign ministry who had interactions with the North Korean leadership; and as such their veracity is confirmed. This is truly remarkable since it ensures that the book contains accurate, verifiable and authentic information. Moreover, the information contained in the book is actionable, that is, it would enable policy formulators to understand North Korea and thereby formulate the appropriate policies which will guide engagement with the dictatorial political leadership.

The author explains in detail how the communist country has been able to manage its foreign alliances (especially with communist countries p.55) while still maintain a precarious independence during times of political ambiguity (for instance, during the Sino-soviet conflict p.99) and also how it presents itself to the world as a model for development for low-income nations (p.59).  

In chapter one, the author describes how the Unfinished 1950-1953 war shaped the political discourse in the Korean Peninsula when the two Koreas divided by both political ideology and foreign alliances entered into a ‘hot conflict’ after North Korea (with soviet assistance) invaded South Korea. The author depicts the political thinking of the soviet leadership regarding the possibility of War in the Korean Peninsula by quoting Joseph Stalin who said:

“If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in the form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.” (p.10)

The above quote does show that North Korea had implicit Soviet approval to invade South Korea, and this approval was informed by the fact that the communist bloc nation viewed the then simmering Korea conflict within the context of the Cold war (p13). Initially, North Korea successfully conducted the war, and it was even able to occupy Seoul, the capital of South Korea (p.25). However, the United States was able to mobilize the non-communist world under the banner of the United Nations to come to the assistance of South Korea which at that time was on the edge of military defeat. The US and its allies were able to push the communists out of South Korea and into North Korea proper, and this led the communist leadership to ask for military assistance from its allies (p.42). Strangely, as the author point out, it was china which came to its assistance and not the Soviet Union as the North Korean had initially expected. With China’s entrance into the conflict, the UN forces were forced out of the lands they had occupied in North Korea and subsequently pushed back to initial border of the two Koreas (p.52). According to the author, this military collaboration between China and North Korea is what informed the North Korean leadership to maintain a policy of diplomatic ambiguity during the Sino-Soviet split as they did not want to lose soviet patronage while at the same time they did not want to antagonize China since it had helped them survive the Korean War (p.111). Moreover, this ambiguity was informed by the fact that the communist leadership did seek to maintain their precarious independence and also avert catastrophic leadership crises as this would allow them to form strategic foreign alliances when necessary (p.101), for instance, this ambiguity enabled North Korea to create formal foreign diplomatic relations with the non-aligned members of the Third world to which North Korea depicted itself as a model nation (p.143, p.178). Moreover, the author explicitly stresses that the experiences of the Korean War did mould the processes adopted by the North Korean regime to guide and control its internal system of power and its external affairs (p.179).

The author also describes how the political leadership of the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea official name) has been able to both covertly and overtly attempt to reach out to the capitalist Occident while concurrently confronting and engaging with its enemies (especially the United States and its ally in the Korean peninsula, South Korea) (p.276). The author shows that this necessity has been informed by the fact that DPRK has been faced by a myriad of opportunities and challenges such as fluidity in its foreign relationships, catastrophic famines, economic isolation, breakup of the Soviet Union, South Korean economic miracle, china’s state-controlled economic liberalization and attempts of rapprochement by the Western nations. Moreover, DPRK has been trying to normalize its relationship with international bodies, and for this reason it has been forced to de-escalate the Korean Nuclear crisis by destroying some of its own nuclear assets (p.280).

Professor Armstrong clearly explains in the book how the DPRK has been able to survive foreign invasions, famines, global calamities and the fall of the Soviet Union with its political leadership still remaining intact while concurrently maintaining the integrity of its internal social harmony (p.292). The author states that North Korea has been able to obtain maximum benefits from its dealing with foreign nations by applying a strategy christened ‘tyranny of the weak’ whereby its political leadership has been able to leverage the country’s objective weaknesses with its significant military resources (p.282). Upon reading the book, one will be able to learn that the North Korean policy of “self-reliance”, which was formulated in the 1950s and have been implemented since then, has enabled the nation to resist external pressure from both allies and enemies (p.279).

Professor Armstrong has done what other scholars who specialize in North Korea issues have been unable to do; describe how history has been used by the political leadership to maintain their grip of power in the nation while also maintaining social harmony. The author has also described how the two major conflicts that have affected North Korea (Cold War and the Korean War p.11) have shaped the worldview of the nation’s political leadership and in extension to both the domestic and foreign policies (p.292). This way, the author attempts to convince his readers that for one to understand North Korea, one must grasp the historical forces which have shaped DPRK; without which, the world will continue to deal erroneously with DPRK (p.293).

In conclusion, my personal reaction to this book is one of pure admiration and respect for the author due to his presentation of authentic verifiable facts in a comprehensible format using a vivid and capturing language. Honestly, this book demystifies North Korean by showing the reader that a lack of understanding of Korean history has led to a general lack of comprehension of the workings of DPRK, and therefore an understanding of Korean history will go a long way into enabling the reader to understand the motivations and intentions that guide the formulation of operational processes which are used to govern the nation by the DPRK leadership. This way, the book exposes the internal mechanisms of the DPRK to a wide audience.